Firstly, Ms Lee addresses the concern that the retention of Section 377A violates the equality clause of the Singapore constitution. She explains that Parliament may enact measures which differentiate between different groups, provided there is a rational basis for that differentiation and a legitimate social aim. She goes on to argue that since sodomy is more prone to transmit STDs than other sex acts, there is a legitimate aim – in this case, the protection of public health – in continued criminalisation. However, while she may have established a legitimate aim, she failed to establish a rational basis for the differential treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals. Surely if sodomy (i.e. anal sex) presents a greater health risk than vaginal or oral intercourse, on her argument the law should impose criminal sanction on anal sex whether performed by homosexuals or heterosexuals, and decriminalise oral sex whether performed by homosexuals or heterosexuals. Her position would only be intelligible if we assume that homosexuals are inherently more prone to disease, an assumption which is supported by no medical authority that I know of.

Secondly, Ms Lee argues that the decriminalisation of homosexual acts will transform societal attitudes, thus paving the way for a broader agenda of legal reforms designed to enshrine homosexuality as a protected category. She then goes on to list a number of possible milestones in this hypothetical future of more tolerant (or, if she prefers, permissive) attitudes toward homosexuality, beginning with equalisation of the age of consent. I presume Ms Lee is thinking in particular here of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, which equalised the age of consent in the UK. Perhaps if Ms Lee had looked more closely at the UK example, her fears would have been somewhat assuaged the 2000 amendment act comes 33 years after the original Sexual Offences Act 1967 which first partially decriminalised private consensual homosexual acts in the UK. Thus, if history is anything to go by, it took three decades for the UK to move to just the second step of her putative broader agenda. Who knows what kinds of changes in social mores three decades might bring? As I am sure Ms Lee would agree, a 'broader agenda' would only be undesirable if foisted on a society which is broadly opposed to it. We should not presume to legislate for the future if, in 30 years' time, society as a whole will indeed decide to embrace this 'broader agenda', I see no rational reason to oppose such as decision, least of all through presumptuous pre-emptive legislation.

Thirdly, Ms Lee's argues that while the decriminalisation of adultery did not result in the greater social and moral legitimacy of adultery, homosexuality is different because 'activists' are campaigning to alter public perceptions of homosexuals. However, this comparison fails, for two very important reasons. Firstly, adultery is universally condemned as immoral, for the obvious reason that it brings great harm, not only to faithful partner but also to the children, whereas the morality of homosexuality is contested, since no clear harm can be established in the case of consensual homosexual activity. Secondly, adultery is an act, not an orientation, whereas homosexual acts spring from a wider orientation.

Indeed, much of Ms Lee's argument seems to repose on her belief that 'sexual orientation is a vague term', which apparently includes 'paedophilia and bestiality' and finds no support in scientific evidence since there is no evidence that people are 'born gay'. It is unfortunate that a professor at our national university saw fit to associate homosexuality with paedophilia and bestiality, since I think the difference between the loving desire for a human and adult partner, of whatever gender, and the sexual desire for a pre-pubescent child, or a dog, or a cow, is very clear to most people. Moreover, she is mistaken to think that the psychological category of sexual orientation is necessarily rooted in a belief in the genetic (or at least pre-natal) origins of homosexuality. In fact, what this category acknowledges is merely a pre-disposition for partners of a certain sex, which is immutable, or at least very difficult to change. The continuing debate in scientific circles over the origins of such an orientation does not at all have a bearing on the universally-accepted medical fact that sexual orientation is fixed and unchosen.

Fourthly, Ms Lee argues that 'homosexuality is offensive to the majority of citizens' and therefore the continued criminalisation of homosexual activity is the only policy which accords sufficient respect to the 'fundamental moral values' of the majority. I do not deny that in certain cases the law ought to show consideration for the moral values of the majority. For example, the law may justifiably restrict access to pornography, if the majority finds such material to be immoral or depraved. However, this is only because no fundamental interests are violated by criminalising the distribution or consumption of pornography. In contrast, what is at stake in this debate is something which goes to the heart of the interests of homosexual persons. A long-term sexual relationship, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is not reducible solely to its sexual component intimate conduct is merely one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. To say that the issue here is simply the ability to engage in certain sexual conduct without criminal sanction demeans the value of sexuality, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is simply about the legal right to have sexual intercourse. Moreover, the relevant sections in the Penal Code which Ms Lee would like to see enforced encompass a range of behaviour which touch on the most private human conduct, and in the most private of places, the home. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons for the proposed abolition of the criminalisation of non-vaginal intercourse between heterosexuals. I can see no reason why it would not apply equally to homosexuals.

Ms Lee appeals to the moral sentiments of the majority of citizens. It is unfortunate that she does not consider the citizenship of homosexuals, who pay taxes, obey the law, perform national service, and through their economic activity contribute to national wealth and provide employment to other citizens. They bear the burdens of citizenship there can be no reason why their basic rights of citizenship, namely that their fundamental interests in expressing their sexuality in a private and consensual relationship be respected, should be violated merely to appease the moral sentiments of the majority.