Exactly how many remain in detention was not revealed, but a rough estimate from the above figures would be 100 or slightly less.

These detentions, and the figures provided, are quite separate from detentions made under the Internal Security Act (ISA). In the last few years, what announcements have been made about detentions under the ISA were of persons alleged to be involved with Jemaah Islamiyah.

* * * * *

 
What is this beast called the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act? It's a very strange animal indeed, as you might have suspected from the fact that the word "temporary" is there in its name.

It first came to life in 1955, and it contains within its text the proviso that the Act shall have a life of five years. Obviously, it has been renewed repeatedly; the last renewal was in October 2004.

The very fact that it was intended to be temporary immediately suggests that the British colonial government saw its provisions as extraordinary, and possibly in violation of the normal rule of law. Indeed, one of the fundamental principles in justice in a democratic society is that no one should be deprived of his liberty without due process in a court of law.

However, the 1950s were years of repeated labour agitation, with strikes affecting essential services and public peace. The British might have felt that some urgent steps had to be taken, even if the powers would be considered excessive under normal conditions. Perhaps they hoped that after five years, things would settle down and detention without trial would no longer be necessary.

If I have time, I will see whether I can dig out the Legislative Council proceedings in which the law was introduced and debated, and see what was said by way of justification.

Why did I mention strikes?

Because a huge chunk of the Act deals with labour strikes in detail. It defines what is a strike, what is a lock-out; what would be legal procedure calling for a strike, and what would be an illegal strike. It talks about penalties for instigating illegal strikes or providing financial support to illegal strikers.

It also provides that when the government makes a formal declaration that an "immediate threat to public peace exists", police officers get enhanced powers to "command any assembly of 10 or more persons within Singapore to disperse". Failure to obey would be an offence. Obviously, it was meant for breaking up strikes and blockades.

By contrast, nothing in the Act talks about drugs, secret societies or loan-sharking, though more recent amendments deal with the powers of police to take fingerprints and body samples.

Thus, it appears that the Act has indeed outlived its original purpose, since politically subversive strikes are no longer an issue now -– for reasons I won't go into -– so what reason is there to keep renewing it?

* * * * *

 
What the Singapore government must surely love is the catch-all Section 30, which allows the minister to detain any person "associated" with criminal activities. What is meant by "associated" is not defined.

The text of Section 30 in full:

30. Whenever the Minister is satisfied with respect to any person, whether the person is at large or in custody, that the person has been associated with activities of a criminal nature, the Minister may, with the consent of the Public Prosecutor ­

(a) if he is satisfied that it is necessary that the person be detained in the interests of public safety, peace and good order, by order under his hand direct that the person be detained for any period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the order; or

(b) if he is satisfied that it is necessary that the person be subject to the supervision of the police, by order direct that the person be subject to the supervision of the police for any period not exceeding 3 years from the date of the order.

Section 31 then says that the detention orders should be referred to an advisory committee and subject to confirmation by President. But

• the Minister can drag his feet; he has 28 days to do the referring;
• the Minister himself appoints the advisory committee (which can be different committees for different cases) so long as the committee consists of at least two persons. No qualification is needed; the Minister is free to appoint his housekeeper and manicurist if he so wishes.

The President may quash the order, amend the order, or prolong the detention.

Let me be blunt: It's a process fit only for banana republics.

* * * * *

Wong told Parliament that such detentions are "only used as a last resort when a serious crime has been committed and a court prosecution is not possible because witnesses are not willing or afraid to testify in court."

It is possible for such scenarios to exist. Secret societies specialise in intimidation, and loan-sharking and drug trafficking tend to involve willing parties on both sides, both of whom might want to deny the transaction.

But one cannot help wondering to what extent the shortcut provided by this law has made our investigation officers lazy. Why bother to painstakingly collect evidence and win the confidence of potential witnesses or informants? Why bother to patrol the streets to offer protection to businesses harried by gangsters? Just recommend detention without trial.

So, when they say prosecution is not possible, how do we, the public, know whether it was because they were too lazy or incompetent to collect evidence?

It's not as if forensic science has remained still through the decades since the 1950s. One can wiretap phones (with a court order), one can trace how banknotes go from one person's hands to another. We have much more sensitive technology for finding fingerprint and DNA traces. And hopefully, the days when no one would trust the police to protect him (because of corruption in the police force) are now past.

Relying on this law undermines the professionalism of our law enforcement officers. Far from being for Singapore's good, in the long term, it is against our own interests.

This is quite apart from the real possibility that totally innocent people have been held without trial from time to time, and quite apart from the possibility that one day, a government may use this law against its political opponents for partisan reasons.

I say: Get rid of this law.

* * * * *

 
It is not as if I am totally against detention without trial, even in the most dangerous times. As I have written before about the threat of terrorism, I can accept that sometimes, the authorities just don't have the time to build a case against terrorists before they set off a bomb.

I can also understand that to gather intelligence, the authorities may need to plant or cultivate informants within terrorist networks, and it would be foolish to reveal in open court who these informants are and what information they provided. It would seriously compromise future intelligence. Yet without their testimony, the rest of the evidence may not be enough to convict.

However, if you are persuaded by the above argument and still feel there is a need for a law providing for detention without trial, then at least agree that it must be narrowly circumscribed to likely acts of mass violence.

Then, I have also said that additional safeguards can and should be put in, for example,

After a period of time, say 3 or 5 years, the government must publish a detailed set of reasons, including supporting evidence, why they slapped a detention order on someone. Surely, after that interval, the informants should have been safely pulled out by then.

This detailed set of reasons should be placed before a court for review.

If the court disagrees with the government's decision and finds that either the case against the detainee was unconvincing, or the person's alleged acts were outside the scope of the law (i.e. he was not actually preparing for violence), then some kind of follow-up action should take place.

Either, the court can haul the minister up and impose a penalty (e.g. jail term) on him,

Or the court can order the government to compensate the unfairly detained person,

Or the ex-detainee can be allowed to sue the minister for illegal confinement, defamation, distress, etc.

Or any combination of the three.

This scheme does not obstruct urgent action if needed; it does not jeopardise secret informants at the time in question. But the minister will know that if he misuses his powers, he will be held accountable, and may eventually end up in jail himself.

© Yawning Bread