It confirmed what I suspected. The "military training" that Rijal is accused of took place in 2000 – interesting that Straits Times didn't think it important to include the date in its story. But other than that, there was nothing else missing. As for what he's been doing lately, the ministry's statement merely made the vague assertion that "At the time of his arrest, Rijal was known to be working with some foreign [Jemaah Islamiyah] elements to discuss regrouping and reviving the JI’s clandestine network.

I cannot say I find myself convinced. It's just too vague. Rather than having a good reason to detain him based on recent and ongoing terrorist activity, Rijal's case appears just as likely to be an example of procedural inertia. He was on the wanted list in December 2001 when Singapore authorities nabbed the first 13 Jemaah Islamiyah guys, and has apparently remained on the list ever since. So when they managed to get him a month ago -- caught in some neighbouring country, apparently -- procedural inertia means he is held rather than released. It would take a very brave civil servant to ask, "Should he still be on the list?"

 
For and against detention without trial

The purists among us would say: Abolish detention without trial. Charge Rijal in court or release him. After all, that's what the Sedition Act is for. You remember that law surely, last used to gag and punish some bloggers? Indeed, if the government has evidence that Rijal had been going around reviving the Jemaah Islamiyah network as alleged, with the intention of causing injury to others or undermining constitutional government, then produce the evidence in court.

On the other hand, such evidence might have been obtained through undercover intelligence sources and the covert operation might still be ongoing. It could jeopardise the moles and future objectives if the evidence, and how it was obtained, had to be tendered in court. Even if one kept the court proceedings sealed -- and that already is problematic in terms of making sure that justice is not only done, but seen to be done -- the evidence would still have to be shown to Rijal's defence lawyers. If Rijal's loyalties are indeed with the underground network, then that is as good as telling Jemaah Islamiyah what covert operations have penetrated their organisation.

It is precisely this kind of problem that may justify preventive detention.

Yet, as it stands, our Internal Security Act is open to abuse. It gives a lot of discretion to the executive branch of government, with virtually no provision for judicial oversight. Looking at Singapore's history since the 1960s, there are many troubling suggestions that this law has indeed been abused at various times.

Chia Thye Poh was held for 23 years and his movements restricted for a further six, on allegations that he was a communist subversive. He was never given a trial, and what evidence the state had against him has never been seen by the public. Chia maintained his innocence throughout, forfeiting the better part of his life for it.

The arrests in 1987 of the so-called "Marxist Catholics" look, on hindsight, to be based on equally flimsy premises. My reading of it was that they were social activists, who were prepared to point out that policy failures on the part of the government contributed to aspects of Singapore they considered unsatisfactory. In other countries, this would be termed "democratic dissent"; in Singapore, it was considered a threat to national security, enough to justify invoking the Internal Security Act.

With this history, how can we trust that the detention of Rijal, or for that matter, Mas Selamat bin Kastari, is legitimate?

 
Tweak the ISA

Addressing this issue in an article in 2002, I proposed that rather than take a purist position and abolish the Internal Security Act, we can take a half-step, by adding a mechanism for early public review. I said that the case for detention without trial should be presented to the public within 5 years of anyone being detained (whether or not he has been released since).

One way by which to do this would be for the government to lay out all its evidence before an independent commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court judge. The commission can release to the public a redacted account of the evidence (leaving out items that the commission -- not the government -- considers to be still operationally useful for intelligence purposes) and add their comments as to the reliability of such evidence, thus in effect, making a retroactive judgement as to whether the government had acted reasonably and in good faith in detaining that person 5 years prior.

Why 5 years? Two main reasons:

Firstly, I think 5 years is enough for most intelligence to reach its use-by date. What was sensitive information at the time of detention should surely not be still sensitive 5 years later. By then, the covert operation, if any, should have been wrapped up; at the same time the subversive network would probably have discovered who the mole was.

5 years however is quite short with respect to political careers. If any minister is found to have abused his power 5 years earlier, he should face the wrath of the public at the next election. A case of corruption may also be made out, and if he is found guilty, he should lose his privileges and pension.

As things stand, there is no provision in law for files to be opened. For example, the evidence against all those accused of communist subversion and detained 50 years ago are still kept under lock and key. This after communism itself has either collapsed or lost all vigour. Why the secrecy? Is there something to hide?

If a minister knows that any decision taken under the Internal Security Act will be published in 5 years' time, he is much less likely to abuse it.

By this proposed rule, the case against the nearly 40 Jemaah Islamiyah guys detained in 2001 and 2002 should be revealed by now. The public should have a right to see how valid were the reasons for detaining them. But would this jeopardise our continuing lookout for the group's terrorism plans? I doubt it. Much has happened in these 5 years: new leaders taken over, new communication codes established, new safe-houses rented, squealers among them figured out by whoever still at large. How can we imagine that the information we had 5 years ago would still be useful to them today?

On the other hand, that information remains useful to the Singapore body politic. Being able to demonstrate that detention was warranted is critical to maintaining a people's trust in the government, especially over such a draconian piece of legislation. 

It's time for the government to lay it on the table. And it's time for Singapore to mature politically. It can begin by establishing this proposed mechanism for an early public review of all preventive detention cases.

© Yawning Bread