China: two little ironies

Last month, Zhao Ziyang, the former Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, died. He had been under house arrest since 1989, when he opposed the use of force against the protestors camped out in Tiananmen Square. 

His death brought the unfinished business of that summer back to the fore, though briefly, for state censorship and the rise of capitalism have reduced the significance of Tiananmen to the average Chinese. Censorship has meant that a whole new generation of Chinese has been mostly fed the official version of events. Capitalism has meant that for most people, their priority is less politics than making money. 

Yet, China is a huge country, and even if a small percentage of people remember Tiananmen, that's still a lot of people. 

The problem of how to mark Zhao's passing could not but be an excruciating problem for the Beijing leadership, for in 1989, the first stirrings of trouble in the square followed the death of Hu Yaobang. 

Hu Yaobang had been General Secretary of the Party until 1987 when he was purged by Deng Xiaoping, for being too reform-minded, especially on matters of political reform.  When he died in April 1989, many of the younger generation who had looked to Hu for inspiration, felt he had not been given an appropriate funeral. They began to gather at Tiananmen Square to honour his memory and to protest the government's failure to do so. 

Their small protest grew and grew through the next 6 weeks till the entire square became a huge encampment of tens of thousands. From complaining about the lack of respect shown to Hu Yaobang in his passing, the demand grew to one of political liberalisation. 

Of course, that could not be acceded to, and the rest is history. 

Thus, the death of Zhao, with its question of official recognition, uncovered a nervousnesss made acute by what had happened the last time. 

At first the Beijing authorities' reaction was quite heavy-handed. There was a news blackout and an overcautious deployment of security forces in Tiananmen Square and around the Zhao family home, with some detachments proving overzealous about restricting entry to the home. 

But as the days passed and no serious incidents developed, together with what the International Herald Tribune reported as internal pressure from some Party officials, the government eased up somewhat. 

In the end, some major concessions were made. The government of Hu Jintao agreed to a burial at Babaoshan cemetery, which is reserved for heroes of Communist China. In addition, an official memorial service, ranking one level below a state funeral, was organised. Zhao's body was draped in the flag of the Communist Party and there were numerous wreaths from various Party officials. At the memorial service, which was attended by some 2,000 people and carried by the media, the government and the party were represented by the 4th most senior person in protocol, Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin, who is also the head of the National People's Congress, China's parliament. 

In a sense, Hu Jintao agreed to just about everything except revising the verdict (which a state funeral would have amounted to). The major sticking point right up to the end was the official eulogy. The government and the Zhao family could not agree on the tone to be struck, so none was issued. There was no way that Hu Jintao could agree to deviate from the party line that Zhao had committed grave errors. Hu Jintao himself was the protegé of Deng Xiaoping, and owed his present position to Deng's anointment. For Hu to say that Deng had been wrong to purge Zhao would be to raise questions about his own legitimacy. 

At least, Hu was able to compromise somewhat. If Zhao had died while Jiang Zemin was still in office, it might have been impossible, for Jiang was a direct beneficiary of Zhao's removal.  

It will take at least one more change in leadership before the violence of 4 June 1989 in Tiananmen can be more objectively reviewed and equal respect given to those on the other side on the conflict. The families of those uncounted numbers who were killed in the suppression are still waiting for closure. 

As recently as 1 June 2004, army doctor Jian Yanyong, retired chief of surgery at a Beijing military hospital was arrested after he circulated a letter that he had written in Feb 2004, denouncing the 1989 Tiananmen affair. Jian was a hero to the Chinese people, having exposed official cover-up at the beginning of the SARS crisis in 2003. His outspokenness eventually brought down the health minister and the mayor of Beijing, and got the Chinese government to take some serious steps to combat the crisis, saving countless lives as a result. Yet it didn't save him from detention when he raised the issue of Tiananmen.

As this episode and the sensitivity and the wrangling about the funeral arrangements showed, Tiananmen remains an open wound, which critics of the Chinese government can use anytime to beat them with. 

And herein lies the irony: the Chinese government uses the Japanese refusal to offer closure on the rape of Nanking and other atrocities committed during the 1930s and 1940s to their advantage whenever they feel like it. 

* * * * * 
 

On 20 December 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao publicly scolded Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa for his poor performance. 

"Hong Kong has to draw conclusions from experience and find out what's been insufficient," Hu was seen to have told Tung and Macao Chief Executive Edmund Ho in a videotape of their meeting. Hu Jintao was in Macau to mark the fifth anniversary of Macau's return to China. 

Indeed, Tung has largely lost the confidence of the Hong Kong people. There has been a series of controversial decisions through the years and the economy has remained anaemic. The Chinese government is painfully aware that dissatisfaction with the Tung Chee-hwa government can easily morph into antagonism towards Beijing.  

Thus, the problem has become a major headache for Hu Jintao, who once more, has to grapple with a legacy left behind by Deng Xiaoping. 

In the run-up to the 1984 accord, when Deng and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agreed on the hand-over of Hong Kong to China, Deng insisted on a kind of 'stay' arrangement, where the undemocratic nature of British colonial rule would not immediately change post-1997. In effect, what was to happen was essentially just a change in sovereign, where China would continue where the UK left off. 

Under the British, the Governor of Hong Kong was always appointed by London, with no say by the people of Hong Kong. Under the Chinese, it is not much different, even though under the Basic Law, an electoral body is first constituted. However, the 800 members of the electoral college are appointed by China and the candidates for Chief Executive must clearly have China's blessing to proceed. In fact, in 2001, Tung was unopposed. Hence, everybody sees the Chief Executive as China's appointee.  

So if Tung Chee-hwa flunks out, it is China's responsibility. If China moves sharply to remove him, it is a major loss of face. The worst part is that Tung has brought disrepute to the constitutional system of an indirectly elected, Beijing-endorsed Chief Executive, whoever might succeed him. Yet that system cannot soon change. When the Democratic Party pushed for free direct elections to the legislature, China stubbornly refused. It would thus be a matter of pride not to change the system of choosing the Chief Executive too. 

If not for pride, the solution for Beijing is really very simple. Let the people of Hong Kong have their free elections, including elections for their Chief Executive. Then whether the resulting government of Hong Kong delivers, is a matter for the Hong Kong people, not a direct responsibility of Beijing. It would be similar to the way Puerto Rico is autonomous within the USA. 

But Beijing has long been afraid of Hong Kong setting too democratic an example for the rest of China. The Communist Party fears it would be impossible to deny Chinese citizens free democratic elections if other Chinese citizens in Hong Kong had those rights. Thus it wants to retain control of the Hong Kong government. 

And the irony is, after Britain ceased being the colonial power, China – the supposedly communist republic – became the new one. 

© Yawning Bread 

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