Southern Thailand: witnessing beginnings

Seldom does one sit in on the opening act of long insurgency. Usually, by the time we read of a rebellion in some foreign country, it would already have escalated to some horribly bloody level. It takes a high level of carnage to get the attention of world's media. 

Remember Rwanda? It was 100,000 killed and counting before anyone noticed! But when the horror reached our TV screen, it seemed to have come out of the blue. We wondered, how did this begin? Why haven't we heard of this conflict before? Why do they hate each other? 

Some of us then read through the few background articles that (some) newspapers carried (rarely TV, which often believes no story should be longer than 3 minutes), to try to understand how the mess got to be where it was. 

And so it is, again and again, where the news media is just a record of events overtaking us. 

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In Southern Thailand this year, we (in Singapore) may have the rare opportunity of witnessing the start of a long problem, not that it is anything to feel happy about. Events are occurring close enough to us geographically that even minor violence merit reporting in our local media, and we can thus trace how small grievances add up into a bigger problem. Of course, we hope they don't, but in this case, I am pessimistic. 

We're not exactly at Act 1, Scene 1. The sense of alienation felt by Muslim Thais in the southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat is long-standing, probably since the kingdom of Pattani was annexed by Siam a hundred years ago. For decades, there has been an independence movement in the area, but they have not been active lately. 

The region is underdeveloped even by Thai standards. There has been little economic development, but no shortage of extortionate corruption by government officials (as is the case with much of Thailand). In addition, the popularity of Islamic schools known as madrasahs has led to an entire generation growing up with knowledge of Arabic and the Koran, but little else of employable value. 

Stir in Jemaah Islamiyah extremists, who have been linked to al-Qaeda and their doctrine of radical, avenging Islam, and we have a combustible situation. 

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2004 is sort of like Act 1 Scene 2, where the seeds of tragedy are sown. 

In the first week of January this year, the authorities were taken by surprise when an arms depot in Narathiwat province was raided by an estimated 30 men, who took off with 400 assault rifles. Simultaneously, schools were set on fire, probably to divert the attention of the security forces. The government had no clue who they were, whether they had a political motive or were plain bandits. 

Regardless, Prime Minister Thaksin declared martial law and sent reinforcements to the South. Even then, commentators were already saying this might make matters worse. With no intelligence capability, little understanding of social grievances, and (it shall be later seen) utter incompetence, they would add to the problem with heavy-handed tactics, hitting out in all directions. 

A local militia was also organised, but this would lead to more trouble in October. 

On April 28, there were scattered attacks on security posts in Yala and Songkhla provinces and in Pattani town by a number of squads. Many observers said the attackers were only armed with machetes and that the police had forewarning. Nevertheless 107 of the attackers were killed, of which 30 were killed within the ancient Krue Sa Mosque (built 1578) in Pattani town.

The 30 men had taken refuge there but after a stand-off of a few hours, the authorities stormed in and killed them all. It seemed an unjustifiably heavy response, and must surely have created more enemies for the government. 

Then in October, the fuse for the third big incident was lit. Six men, local members of the new militia, were arrested by the police, suspected of having given or sold their weapons to the insurgents – which suggested that the army had no idea who were insurgents or their sympathisers, and therefore could not effectively screen people before recruiting them. Perhaps they were sympathisers, perhaps not, but the local population had so little trust in the police that they were convinced the six had been falsely accused. 

A demonstration was organised in Tak Bai village (Narathiwat province) to demand their release. The police called in army reinforcements. They arrived, things got tense and confused amidst the tear gas and water cannons and shooting started. Six men were killed. 

Hundreds more were arrested, some of whom had been injured. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were loaded – hauled by soldiers and thrown – onto trucks for a long drive to an army camp in the next province of Pattani. With so many prisoners and so few trucks, the army stacked the prisoners five or six deep, men lying atop men. By the time the trucks reached their destination three hours later, 78 more had suffocated to death. 

Needless to say, this will only feed the resentment of the local population. 

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If the army was stupid and callous, and yes, criminal in the way they treated their prisoners, the Prime Minister was hardly any better. His first response was to defend the army's actions, adding that the 78 men died because they were already weak from fasting during the month of Ramadan. His insensitivity was breathtaking.

Between these headline incidents, there have been bombs going off and almost daily shootings of teachers, policemen, railway workers and just about anyone associated with the State. Recently, a village deputy headman was kidnapped and beheaded, clearly an act inspired by events in Iraq. As reported in the Sunday Times of 7 November 2004, more than 450 people have died from these bombings and shootings.

Besides more troops being sent to the South and a change of army commander, the government has displayed neither comprehension of the underlying dynamics nor a strategy for dealing with the problems. 

We're going to see lot more violence before things get better. 

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I won't be surprised if in due course, convenient labels – "Islamic terrorists", "Muslim separatists" -- will be applied to the situation in the media. Reporters rarely have the space or time to fill in the background or lay on the nuances of a story, yet they have to make it one that is easy for readers from Wellington to Washington to grasp. While there is a grain of truth in the terrorism and the religious connection, it should be obvious from a close scrutiny of these early events that much of the momentum, and thus much of the responsibility for the tragedy if it develops, can be traced to government callousness. 

However depressing, here is a rare instance where we have front row seats for the opening of a drama.

© Yawning Bread 

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