Taiwan: the next nuclear flashpoint?

Amidst all the fury and confusion of the closely-fought presidential election in Taiwan this month, where at the time of writing, it still isn’t clear who will emerge as the final winner after a recount – if there is going to be a recount – some long-term trends are being missed.

Much of the current political noise centers on the extremely slim margin of victory that Chen Shui-bian secured on the first count. He got only 50.1 % of valid votes, compared to 49.9% for Lien Chan and his running mate James Soong.

But these figures actually show that Chen increased his vote from the previous presidential election of 2000. In that one, Chen only got 39.3% of the valid votes cast, in a three-cornered fight. James Soong got 36.8% and Lien Chan got 23.1%. Together, Lien and Soong marshaled 59.9%. (There were 2 more minor candidates).

This year, Lien and Soong joined forces, but their share of the vote decreased to 49.9%, and Chen’s increased to pip them at the finish line (subject to recount).

Chen’s increase can also be seen in the absolute numbers of votes cast. Chen got nearly 6.5 million votes in 2004 compared to 4.9 million in 2000. Since turnout was high in both elections (80% in 2004 and 83% in 2000), these figures are a good gauge of voter sentiment.

As everyone knows, Chen is the pro-independence candidate. He believes in a Republic of Taiwan. What his increasing share of the vote indicates, despite difficult economic conditions in the country, is that there is growing support for that point of view.

Even the Kuomintang (Lien’s party) has had to shift with the times. Where previously, the party’s stance was for reunification with the mainland (on Taiwan’s terms of course), this has been de-emphasised lately, so as not to lose votes. Now the Kuomintang is the party for maintaining the status quo, which is a kind of de facto independence without abandoning the principle of very-distant reunification.

So who’s for reunification? No one!

 
China's options

This puts China in a real dilemma. How does one hope for peaceful reunification if there is no counterpart on the other side of the Taiwan Straits working towards the same end?

Furthermore, as the 2004 election results showed, with the passage of time, increasing numbers of Taiwanese are subscribing to the ideal of a separate republic.

This is to be expected. The great majority of Taiwanese were born after 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek set up a separate administration in Taipei. They have never had the experience of being part of China, and the idea of being subsumed into a much more populous entity can’t be terribly attractive. There’s too much to lose their way of life, their freedoms, their very identity.

The only path towards peaceful reunification is for China to open up completely to the Taiwanese, which means full cultural and economic integration, so that the islanders get reassured that life will continue much as before even if they’re a part of China. It would also help if the Chinese also open up politically so that there is some convergence between the totalitarian style of the mainland with the free-wheeling democratic style of Taiwan.

And even then, there’s no guarantee that the Taiwanese won’t increasingly see themselves as a people apart. The Irish republic doesn’t look very different from the UK and there’s plenty of trade and investment between the two, but ask the Irish if they want to be part of the UK and the I’m sure you’ll get a resounding ‘no’.

Moreover, Beijing has never shown the necessary degree of finesse when it comes to winning public opinion – look at how it has virtually antagonized all of Hong Kong – and it would be unrealistic to expect a totalitarian government to learn such subtle political skills overnight.

The great danger then is that Beijing increasingly relies on the military option. They are already building up their forces as rapidly as their economy allows.

While many people think it would be foolish for Beijing to attack because the damage to its own economic prospects would be unquantifiable, history has shown that pride has a logic of its own.

This is compounded by the Chinese government’s need to fan nationalism to justify its legitimacy. Marxism is dead. It wins no political support, and provides no crutch for holding onto power. In its place, the Chinese Communist Party needs glory from overturning old humiliations.

There are many degrees of force between no war and all-out war. Imagine a gradually-tightening naval blockade that interrupts much of Taiwan’s external trade, but leave enough gaps so as not to tip the US into war. The aim then would not be to conquer Taiwan, but to squeeze it hard enough till it negotiates.

 
Taiwan's options

Now, if you are a Taiwanese defence planner, what is your response?

We don’t have to go into lots of technical details to understand a simple point. For the Taiwanese, such a conflict (even a slow-burning variant of it) would be an existential one. In the long run, Taiwan cannot hope to see off a blockade or a conventional war against a country of 1.3 billion people. Taiwan needs a force multiplier large enough to compensate for the stark arithmetic. And note: an existential conflict justifies all means. Nuclear is the word.

Only when Taiwan can threaten to wipe Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou and Hong Kong off the map will they stand a chance of getting the Chinese to think of alternatives to nationalistic bombast.

Of course, it’s easier said than done. Going nuclear requires R&D on two fronts: the warhead and the delivery system (usually missiles). Warheads can be developed in secret, as the Pakistanis have shown, and there may be any number of sympathizers in the US to help Taiwan gain the necessary parts and knowhow.

Delivery systems are a different matter. Testing them is pretty obvious to people around you, and one can be sure that the moment the Taiwanese embark on long-rage missile tests, China will up the ante too.

What we have is an extremely dangerous situation. It is especially so as all the forces – demographic, political and military, point towards escalation.

 
The need for options!

Real conflict will make this an "Asian century" in a way we would not want. It is absolutely vital now for neighbours and other interested parties to get involved diplomatically. It may involve intervening in the domestic politics of China to try to change public opinion in China to a more accommodating view, so as to lessen the nationalistic pressure on the Beijing government.

But the damn thing is that Beijing insists it’s a domestic issue with no role for outsiders. And the same prickly pride means they will not want anyone’s advice.

We may have a ringside seat to an unfolding tragedy.

© Yawning Bread 

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