| August
1998
21st century geopolitics
|
|
The small report from Agence France Presse spoke volumes to me. "China
warned Indonesia's chief of police yesterday to stop prevaricating and take
action against those responsible for atrocities against ethnic Chinese during
the mid-May riots."
Here was a new big power interfering in what may be called the domestic affairs of another state. Indonesia's neighbours and fellow-members of ASEAN have all been studiously guarded in their comments about the riots, in keeping with their solemn policy of non-interference. But in Hong Kong newspapers, there was a hue and cry. Taiwan has discontinued aid to economically stricken Indonesia on account of lack of progress with bringing the perpetrators of the atrocities to justice, and now China weighs in as well. What triggered this China Daily comment was the Indonesian police chief's response to people bringing complaints to his department about mass rapes and organised looting. He accused non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of exaggerating the reports (which, let me say, they may have -- we don't know yet). Furthermore, he was reported to have said that if the NGOs were unable to substantiate their reports of mass rape, they might themselves be interrogated by the police and charged with disseminating false information. Certainly, it is no way for a police chief to behave in the midst of a volatile and sensitive situation, and of all people, he should realise it is the police department's responsibility to investigate complaints and not expect to have proof delivered to them on a silver platter by the complainants. But to have the official China Daily criticise him is something else, especially when a commentary like that must have been cleared by higher-ups in Beijing. Let it be said, I'm not a believer in sovereign non-interference. I have said so before. I have always thought that such a policy is often carte-blanche for petty dictators to do as they please within their little stomping patch. ASEAN's recent reiteration of such a policy at their Manila foreign ministers' meeting was, in my opinion, a disgraceful show of unctuous self-serving timidity. It was a shame that the bold proposal by Thai Foreign Minister Surin, for more flexible engagement was shot down. He probably didn't have Indonesia in mind, but more the hardline and undemocratic rule in Myanmar, Still, the principle's the same. It is unconscionable that ASEAN governments will not allow foreign interest in a member government's human rights record. Instead it is China that is now butting in, alright, for what may be well be a dangerously wrong motive -- Chinese racial interest -- but when I saw the report, I couldn't help but wonder if this may be a harbinger of things to come. 1998 has seen quite a few harbingers of the new geopolitics. In the midst of the economic meltdown, China has appeared responsible and statesmanlike in trying to hold up the yuan, to avoid a third round of collapse after the yen gave way. China is being seen, alongside Japan, as the economic linchpin for the region, and the more reliable one too. Japan, on the other hand is shown up for what it is, a technically advanced and rich place (despite its troubles), but a confounding void in policy and leadership -- political, military and now, economic! There was also President Clinton's visit to China, which went very well. This should help to bolster the strategic dimension to the two countries' relationship. It was noteworthy that Clinton didn't stop over in Japan, underlining the emerging bilateralness of US-China ties. The unexpected thing about Clinton's visit was his speaking directly to the Chinese people, and the fact that a newly-confident Jiang Zemin allowed him to. Together with the increasing numbers of Chinese studying in the States with many settling there, leading to rapid growth of personal contact and commercial ties, the US-China relationship is going to acquire a depth that we can barely imagine today. Another big event in 1998 was India going overtly nuclear. From the very words of their Defence Minister just prior to the detonations, China is seen as India's main security threat. Meanwhile, Russia sinks ever deeper into bankruptcy and governmental chaos. Now, pulling these threads together, I am going to take a leap -- some may call it a flight of fancy -- and try to spin out the key geopolitical features of the mid 21st century.
Within the lifetimes of most of us, China will climb up to be among the largest economies in the world -- in overall economic output, not per capita income. The US will be in the top league still, and Europe may be of the same rank, but unless Europe achieves complete political union, which I doubt, it won't be able to weld its economic power to geopolitical ends. Sometime in the first quarter of the 21st century, China will resume investing in its military, and this time, not in a defensive way, but more towards projection of power. It will see as its main security concerns, a potentially aggressive India and the scenario of a havoc-wrecking Russia in conflict with Central Asia. To counter both these threats, as well as to support proxy allies, long-range projection of air and naval power will be required. Furthermore, there will be continuing concerns about internecine conflict in Korea and Southeast Asia, and of course, a need to balance American forces in the West Pacific. The nature of the Chinese response will again be naval and air, supported by ever more intensive diplomatic engagement, "interference", if you wish, with countries in the region. All this will be happening against a backdrop of burgeoning commercial ties and cross-investment between China and its East and Southeast Asian neighbours. Even Australia will see increasing Chinese investment, as Beijing tries to secure access to minerals and food. China will dominate the region economically and militarily in a way not seen since the Ming Empire [1], and the autonomy of East and Southeast Asian states will be compromised. This region, perhaps even Australia and New Zealand, will be to China what Latin America is to the US. Like it or not, China will wield some kind of hegemony over it. The economies will be intricately linked to China, and even culturally, they may, to some extent, be in awe of it. The region will not exactly be in love with China, not at all. Just as the Latin Americans have very mixed feelings about the gringo, the other East Asians will feel an unsettling mix of dependency, inevitability, emulation, yet occasional defiance vis-à-vis the Chinese. But the reality will be that no other power may challenge Beijing between Guam and the Bay of Bengal. The US will remain the No. 1 power in the world. Its technological lead and wealth will remain unassailable for at least 50 years. In its own sphere of influence, Latin America and Europe, there will be no challengers, but East Asia will be gradually conceded to China, in the larger interest of geopolitical stability. I wouldn't assume that this concession will be easy. It has never been easy any time in history, for a pre-eminent power to concede space to an emerging rival. There will be stand-offs, loud rhetoric and maybe even some tense moments. But the price of not conceding a greater role to China in East Asia will be too high to pay. Remember the terrible regional wars of the last half-century? The conflicts in Korea (1950's), Vietnam (1950's - 1970's) and Cambodia (1970's - 1980s) were fuelled by big-power tussles. It is no concidence that the 1990's have been relatively peaceful, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the stabilisation of the US-China relationship.
There may be an interesting parallel between the American and Chinese spheres of influence. In the American sphere, there will be a rich Europe, which will play a supportive role, but most of the time, politically and militarily unadventurous. In the East, Japan will play, even more starkly, this neutered role, to China. Even now, despite the US-Japanese military treaty, no one can imagine Tokyo challenging Beijing diplomatically, let alone militarily. What more when China has a blue-water navy and half of Japan's overseas investment? Europe may have wealth and technology, but it has undergone an immense cultural change in this century. It has lost its sense of 'la mission civilisatrice' on a global scale. For the foreseeable future, its project of a European Union will be of paramount interest to itself. While this focus will be very useful in stabilising Central and Eastern Europe, it takes away from attention to matters outside the continent. In any case, as a loose confederation of states, it will have a hard time getting its diplomatic and military act together; that's why I say it will be unadventurous. Europe will be content to stick alongside the Americans most of the time. Japan will be hobbled by its culture. In the importance it places on consensus, it is culturally not attuned to providing political leadership on the world stage. Furthermore, for the next generation or two, there is unlikely to be any change in the people's aversion to arms. So like Europe, it will remain an economic animal, except that, unlike Europe, it cannot long depend on the Americans for security. The Americans have no sentiment for Japan the way they have for Europe, for reasons of culture and history. The security treaty between Washington and Tokyo is a hold-over from the Cold War. With Moscow a non-issue and the American relationship with China deepening, the security treaty may become a liability rather than an asset (from the American point of view). There will be a gradual distancing as Japan learns to work more closely with China in managing the international relations of East Asia.
The Independents: Russia and India Russia and India are too big to be part of anybody's scheme, but neither can be expected to have enough clout on the world stage to have its own sphere of influence. At least, not for the next 50 years. To give a positive spin on it, you could say they'd be independent counterweights. A more negative view would to be to call them spoilers. India, a serious nuclear threat coupled with a biggish economy, is going to play a bigger part than it has in the last 50 years. Yet, while India will have a population as large as China's and will expect to be treated equally, it will not be. Internally its social strains will continue, if not intensify with an exploding population and continued inequality of income. Externally, it may not be able to break out of a mindtrap that puts itself at odds against Islam -- and that's a lot of neighbours on its western flank. These will impede its emergence as an influential world power, yet it will feel that it deserves to be treated as one. With China to its north, Chinese-influenced Southeast Asia to its east, and Pakistan-supporting Middle East to its west (and maybe a Chinese fleet to its south), Delhi will feel insecure and will have a chip on its shoulder in its strategic relations with Beijing. Perhaps the US and India may see each other as useful allies against a rising China? That will be a very dangerous form of gamesmanship. It's too early to say how Russia may turn out, but in the last 7-8 years, the whole society and economic structure have been crumbling. The government's writ does not go very far. They can't even collect their tax revenues. The mafia have taken over huge chunks of the economy. Public health is falling apart, looking at how male life expectancy has fallen to developing-country levels of 57 years, and infrastructure will soon collapse for corruption and lack of maintenance. Or more specifically, melt down, if we're talking about their creaky nuclear power stations. Russia, once a world superpower, will feel humiliated for generations to come. The danger is if they see the US as the cause of their humiliation, having lost to Cold War to the Americans. If things continue to go badly in Russia, they may turn highly nationalistic, and in the 21st Century, may play the main spoiler to the US.
China, US, Russia and India will be contesting for influence in the Middle East and Africa, which doesn't augur well for peace in either place. Most of the African states will remain pre-modern for a few generations to come, which means more tribal conflicts and civil war. Somewhere, one has also to factor in the death toll from AIDS. In some parts, up to 25% of adults are infected. This massive dying, from war and disease, will be on the nightly news for years to come. The US and Europe will get tired of the continent. Russia and India may however see a chance to build a sphere of influence there. If they try, China and the US will be sucked in again to check the Russians and Indians, and the prognosis will be of even more proxy wars. And more dying. The Persian Gulf is likely to get more attention from the big powers because of oil, though today, the importance of oil as fuel is declining. But the world's thirst for it may grow again, particularly from East Asia, as its share of world GNP increases. I see China getting involved, as it tries to secure access to oil for itself. India may also want to stake out its interest in the region, but unless it can settle its relationship with Pakistan (unlikely for a few more decades), it is going to be an uphill task finding loyal friends in the Islamic Middle East. The Middle East of the future can get very messy. I foresee social upheaval in one country after another. In too many countries, the autocratic political structure is too brittle to accommodate the rising expectations of its people. The trouble with social upheaval is that it is chaotic and partly irrational, unlike geopolitics, which is calculative. For example, how many could have predicted an Ayatollah regime to follow the Shah's in Iran? So, I will make no predictions for the shape of Arab society beyond 20 years.
The key to international peace in the mid 21st Century will be the relationship between the two main powers, the US and China. From the way things are going today, it appears that both Washington and Beijing understand this very well. Economically and geographically, neither country threatens the core interest of the other. Religion however, as in centuries past -- from the Moorish conquest of Spain, to the crusades, to European empire building, to the creation of Pakistan -- can upset everything. But nowadays we don't mean religion as in God and that kind of thing. I mean religion as in political ideology, such as the contest between the Free World and Communism (Boy, do they sound dated!). The US will always be interested in human rights. It is after all, its founding charter, it's raison d'être. So how much reform and liberalisation China undertakes in the next few decades, and how well Americans learn to deal with a culturally and historically different place like China may well determine the tenor of the two big powers' relationship. Almost as important will be the two powers' handling of their relationships with India and Russia. All being nuclear states, a misstep can be disastrous. The other thing to watch for is China's relationship with Russia. As the Chinese economy grows and its political reach extends, it is likely to encroach, diplomatically and commercially, on the Central Asian states, and together with Japan, even develop considerable commercial interests in Siberia. At what point Moscow reacts adversely to that, and what then follows as China defends its newly extended interests, is another nail-biting question. * * * * * * * * * * Well, that's my crystal-gazing for you. It looks as if the 21st Century will be at least as restless as the 20th. Hopefully, it won't be anywhere near as bloody. It is very difficult to see beyond the mid 21st Century. America or China may not be able to sustain its economic momentum. India may catch up in wealth or technology. Europe may finally become a single entity with foreign policy and defence goals of its own, quite separate from the Americans. The Russians may have gotten over their troubles and history. The Japanese may be quite a different people culturally. Then there's Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Mexico ... or an extra-terrestrial civilisation! Another reason why we can't predict beyond the mid Century is from experience. At the end of the 19th, the main players of the first half of the 20th could be identified: Britain, Germany, USA, Japan, France and somewhere at the margins, Russia. But not the chief actors in the second half. No one could have imagined a Soviet Union as a superpower challenging the Americans. The idea of a united (or at least, uniting) Europe would have been pure fiction. China would turn out to be even more remarkable a tale. At the turn of the century when China was in the throes of the Boxer Rebellion, with western forces marching up from Tianjin to Beijing and sacking the Summer Palace, to have suggested then that there would be a Communist China complicating the geopolitical plans of Washington and Moscow from 1950 onwards, would have been nothing but comic relief. So if there's any lesson to be learnt, it is that 50 years is a long, long time. I first heard this in the 1970s when the Soviet Union seemed impregnable: An old Russian was asked, where were you born? In St Petersburg. Where did you grow up? In Petrograd. Where do you live now? In Leningrad. Where would you like to be buried? In St Petersburg. [2] And guess what? Within 20 years of that, the man could genuinely realise his wish! Be humble. Each one of us. Whatever country we
belong to, whatever civilisation we are proud to come from, it can crumble from
superpower to history in a blink of an eye. Only our humanity survives. As
individuals. In a world awash with uncertainty. © Yawning Bread
|
|
|
Footnotes
Addenda None
|
|
